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8.1. Introduction
The growing importance of Information and Communication Technologies 
(henceforth ICTs), digital penetration, wireless communication and social 
media in economic, political and socio-cultural development comes to stark 
contrast with the scarcity of available research on their societal role. The rapid 
transformation of digital societies has been felt by present generations who 
were living adult lives without a mobile phone until the mid-1990s, or without 
a computer, for that matter. After briefly discussing above what is seen in each 
of the maps that have been developed, we now turn to what they represent all 
together, what is left out of them, and what policy guidelines towards “Smart 
Growth”, under the EU2020S, can be concluded from them. This last point is 
dubious, because none of the obstacles and action areas detailed in the flagship 
initiative “A Digital Agenda for Europe” (summarised by Lois, 2012: 25-28; 
European Commission, 2010) are relevant with mapping as such. neverthe-
less, we will discuss digital societies in combination with the flagship initia-
tives “Innovation Union”, “Youth on the Move”, and “An Agenda for new 
Skills and Jobs”, which are all relevant with the flagship initiative “A Digital 
Agenda for Europe” and are basic dimensions of “Smart Growth” under the 
Eu2020s.
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In general, digital society signals have been called by many as “the pro-
cess of convergence”. Integration takes place at one of the following levels 
(van Dijk, 2006: 7):
- Infrastructure — for example combining the different transmission 
links and equipment for telephone and computer (data) communica-
tions.
- Transportation — for example Internet telephony and web TV riding 
on cable and satellite television.
- Management — for example a cable company that exploits telephone 
lines and a telephone company that exploits cable television.
- Services — for example the combination of information and commu-
nication services on the Internet.
- Types of data — putting together sounds, data, text and images.
However, it has been pointed out several times that “The digital revolution 
has transformed the lives of many, but also has left untouched the lives of many 
others. As a result, a large segment of the world population misses out on the 
tremendous political, social, economic, educational, and career opportunities 
created by the digital revolution. This gap between the information haves and 
have-nots is commonly referred to as the digital divide” (Yu, 2002: 2). It is un-
der this perspective that current and future research ought to be directed.
8.2. Regions or Cities with Weaknesses or Challenges
Systematisation of regions done above shows that weaknesses occur on the 
Eastern and Southern periphery of Europe especially as concerns people 
working at the ICT sector (weakest regions are located in the South-Eastern 
macro-region, Map 8.1), broadband penetration (weakest regions in the Bal-
kans, Map 8.2), e-commerce (Map 8.3, “worst” regions in Southern Europe). 
However, the situation is reversed in the indicator of individuals who have 
never used a computer (Map 8.4), with the EU core as the most disadvantaged 
in this respect.
However, the assessment through mapping is not adequate or reliable. 
Weaknesses may be considered as challenges, as in Map 8.2 which represents 
a condition easy to address by policy, and may hide opportunities in other re-
spects, as in Map 8.4. There are alternative opportunities for populations in the 
EU core who have never used a computer, as we will discuss below.
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All maps corroborate the general agreement among researchers, that in-
come and GDP relate positively with digital penetration rates (Castells et al., 
2004: 9-10). Weaknesses concentrate where digital exclusion occurs. This has 
snowball effects towards poverty and disadvantage. “The distribution of ben-
efits is far from evenly spread. As argued by the e-inclusion report of the EC 
([European Commission], 2001), whilst Internet usage increases in all groups, 
access gaps are getting broader. Moreover, digital exclusion is frequently cu-
mulative, adding to other social disadvantage. […] [P]eople with low income, 
the less educated, and the unemployed are well below the average level of 
Internet access; older people and the disabled are another particularly disad-
vantaged group; and gender differences are particularly strong within groups 
that are disadvantaged for other reasons. The e-inclusion strategy […] should 
be part of broader actions aimed at combating social exclusion” (Craglia et 
al., 2004: 54-55).
Going about the fascinating task of discovering and then explaining geog-
raphies of the digital society in Europe and globally, we have used some crude 
indicators, for instance: “the number of computer shops and Internet café’s, 
or the per capita number of cellular phones (which increasingly incorporate 
IT services) as some proxy for the availability of physical access; the range 
of e-services provided by the local authority and number of hits on their web-
site as a measure of flow; and the number of government services providing 
different forms of reply or interactivity as a proxy for the attitude of the local 
authority to public participation” (Craglia et al., 2004: 61). We soon came to 
realise, however, that the mapping of indicators is not sufficient. “Surveys 
are likely to be necessary at any rate to address particular areas of disadvan-
tage, and capture more qualitative measures of relevance, use, and need of 
Internet-based information and services. As an example, and following the 
recommendations of the e-inclusion report ([European Commission], 2001) 
the number and extent of local on-line community initiatives in disadvan-
taged neighborhoods are important indicators to be developed to ensure that 
cumulative social exclusion is not ignored or hidden inside average city-wide 
measures” (Craglia et al., 2004: 61).
Income and GDP do not explain the whole range of variations. “Beyond 
economic indicators, there are other factors such as culture and government 
policy, that may influence the rate of wireless technology penetration (Cas-
tells et al., 2004: 10). There are also strong geographical factors which may 
supersede income and GDP. Map 8.4, indicating less penetration of laptops 
in the dense European core, must be seen in its geographical context. Periph-
erality creates dependence on computers and wireless technology. Scandina-
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vian supremacy and innovations must be seen in the context of the relevant 
landscapes. Forests with a very sparse settlement pattern are quite important 
for the boost of production and penetration there. The Greek islands are also 
a positive environment, but production here has lagged, in contrast with pen-
etration of ICTs, especially boosted by residential tourism (Leontidou, 2006). 
By contrast, France was content with teletext for a long time and did not create 
any important digital dependence.
As to policy guidelines, “In the competition among member states, re-
gions, and cities to win the prize for the ‘most connected’, the danger is that 
the emphasis will continue to be given to measures of physical access, and 
much less on social access (Kling, 1999), that is, the extent to which users 
have the ability to search, retrieve, interpret, and use the information they are 
seeking. Moreover, that pockets of disadvantage will be conveniently ignored 
to concentrate on average measures.” (Craglia et al., 2004: 54-55).
From the perspective of employment, a shortage of ICT practitioners is 
mentioned by the “Agenda of new Skills and Jobs” flagship initiative (Lois, 
2012: 30, 38), at the same time when ICT experts are released into unemploy-
ment, redundant from in e-skilled jobs, especially in the European South worst 
affected by the crisis. Map 8.1 most probably reflects the shortage of ICT jobs. 
This relates in a negative way with this flagship initiative and in this, policy 
is essential. Besides wasting achievements of educating a population for the 
Digital Society, the ‘brain waste’ of ICT workers is a serious matter, men-
tioned by the EU2020S (Lois, 2012: 37). Policy for employment creation and 
insertion in the South-East of Europe is urgent, especially given the economic 
crisis.
8.3. Regions or Cities with Strengths or Potentials
Europe is quite strong in ICT development, though the systematisation of re-
gions done above shows that strengths decline as we move to the Southern and 
Eastern periphery of the EU. By contrast, the nordic countries are strong in 
every respect, and have innovated globally in ICT development.
This started with the mobile phone. Cellphone penetration moved from 
north America in the early 1990s to Europe in the new millennium. This “shift 
in the trend can be attributed to the spillover effects from the four nordic Eu-
ropean countries that propelled Europe into the forefront of wireless commu-
nication technology usage. Europe […] has followed most closely the classic 
S-shaped diffusion curve for mobile adoption, while north America and Asia 
have relatively more gentle trends. At this point, a second observation that 
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stands out is the growth spurt experienced in Europe between 1997 and 2000” 
(Castells et al., 2004: 7). “nordic countries worked together in the establish-
ment of an European standard normative, GSM, which is, indeed, one of the 
factors that helped the diffusion of mobile telephony in the continent […]. The 
GSM standard was assumed by all the EU members, meaning that the same 
standards had been imposed in the richer part of the continent” (Castells et 
al., 2004: 13). Due to lack of available datasets at the regional scale, SIESTA 
maps do not include indicators for the cellphone, and this is a major gap ac-
cording to the following analysis.
Strengths and potentials also concentrate in cities. Metropolitan areas 
are not particularly stronger in two of the maps, but they are in e-commerce 
(Map 8.3) and people employed in the ICT sector (Map 8.1). Worldwide, “the 
countries with the highest urbanization levels do not have the highest mobile 
penetration rates. Uruguay and Argentina are the most urbanized but have 
the eighth and sixth highest mobile penetration respectively” (Castells et al., 
2004: 8). Peripherality apparently creates ICT dependence. However, in other 
respects, mapping shows that cities are dense in digital ICTs and social me-
dia, and many urban environments are rich in information systems and data 
sources. “Cities are particularly affected by the impacts of ICTs. Although 
early analysis predicted that the development of ICTs would be the ‘death of 
distance’ (Cairncross, 1997) rendering the urban agglomerations meaningless, 
the evidence points to the contrary: cities remain very much the central nodes 
of power relations and communication infrastructures even in the new digital 
economy (Castells, 1996).” (Craglia et al., 2004: 54).
The strength of the Internet currently is that it becomes increasingly in-
teractive. This exchange, communication, interaction and movement cannot 
be captured in maps, not only because of the risks of the ‘ecological fallacy’. 
A cross-sectional figure on a map does not capture the rapid movement of 
“multimodal communication from anywhere to anywhere where there is the 
appropriate infrastructure” (Castells et al., 2004: 1) or “the deep connection 
between wireless communication and the emergence of a youth culture (that 
leads to what we call a mobile youth culture)” (Castells et al., 2004: 3), or 
“the transformation of language by texting and multimodality, the growing 
importance of wireless communication in socio-political mobilization, ‘par-
ticularly outside formal politics’ (p.3), and changes in the practice of time and 
space resulting from wireless communication” (Castells et al., 2004: i). Such 
strengths must be seriously considered as to their geographical consequences.
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Map 8.1. People working in the ICT sector as percentage of total regional 
employment, 2010.
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Map 8.2. Broadband penetration rate as percentage of total regional households, 
combined years from 2006 to 2009.
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Map 8.3. Individuals (aged 16 to 74) who ordered goods or services over the 
Internet for private use as percentage of regional population, 2010.
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Map 8.4. Individuals who have never used a computer as percentage of regional 
population, 2011.
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8.4. Policy Guidelines and Limitations of the Available Maps
Policies for the Digital Society cannot be formulated in a territorial way, ex-
cept for the obvious aspect of cooperation among regions, which is facilitated 
by networking, social media and the interactive technologies of ICT and cul-
tures. Otherwise, policies must be formulated thematically. From the exam-
ination of the 4 maps we proposed policy guidelines from the perspective of 
employment, since Map 8.1 most probably reflects the shortage of ICT jobs 
rather than the shortage of ICT expert personnel. This relates in a negative 
way with several EU2020S flagship initiatives, and relevant policy for em-
ployment creation and insertion in the South-East of Europe is urgent, espe-
cially given the economic crisis.
However, even in this, the maps do not deal with two important quali-
fications: (1) the very “transformation of the work process and of the work 
place by wireless communication” (Castells et al., 2004: 2) and (2) the fact 
that “the more a technology is interactive, the more it is likely that the users 
become the producers of the technology in its actual practice” (Castells et 
al., 2004: 1).
There is a scarcity of research in new phenomena of ICT development, 
and a low level of insertion of ICT problematic into the social sciences. We 
should be in full awareness that still, 8 years after Castells et al. (2004) pro-
duced a report on wireless communication, “because of the novelty of the 
phenomenon and the slow motion of traditional academic research to uncover 
new fields of inquiry, the stock of contrasted knowledge on this subject is too 
limited to grasp empirically the emerging trends that are transforming com-
municative practices.” (Castells et al., 2004: 1). The scarcity and poverty of 
research has boosted the imaginations of visionaries, futurologists, planners 
and artists at least until the turn of the millennium, often with views which 
subsequently proved to be wrong (e.g. Cairncross, 1997).
Policy guidelines are thus a difficult task, given limitations of data availa-
bility, not only in EUROSTAT and beyond. Social surveys are urgently needed 
to understand the phenomena. Regarding the present mapping exercise, it is 
also limited, since data is scarce; however, there are sources for additional 
indicators which the EU2020S has not tapped because they are not at the re-
gional scale.1 As this kind of technology develops, additional indicators can 
1  Indicators such as those reported by Craglia et al. (2004: 60): percentage of the population regularly us-
ing the Internet, number of computers at school per 100 pupils, participation through the number of Public 
Internet Points per 1000, percentage of central government websites, etc.
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be created, digitally.2 Another problem is that the rapidity of transformation 
makes “descriptive data become rapidly obsolete” (Castells et al., 2004: 2). 
The ESPOn-SIESTA maps have been constructed to represent a small set of 
indicators among many, in one time period. The limited availability of dia-
chronic cross-country indicators and available at the regional scale has limited 
the research ambitions. The indicators mapped are rather out of date even two 
years after data collection, in the face of a rapidly changing reality, and they 
do not capture at least two time periods in order to help us assess ICT change 
and diffusion of wireless communication, which is rather more important than 
a cross-sectional image of it.
The maps do not capture the diversity of alternative ICT infrastructures 
which oscillate in the different countries or even regions: as already a compari-
son between Maps 8.1 and 8.4 has shown, places which are poor in one respect 
of digital technology, could be rich in another. “There are different ways of 
accessing the Internet or other data sources wirelessly, such as via cell phones, 
pagers, laptop computers, PDAs or other specially designed devices, such as the 
Blackberry. Technological standards, for example the relatively unsuccessful 
Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) developed in Europe for cell phone web 
browsing, or the more successful Japanese I-mode system, Wide Area networks 
(WAns), and wireless Local Area networks (WLAns) or Wi-Fi also represent 
different ways of organizing wireless data access, that are being used in different 
markets” (Castells et al., 2004: 29). The SIESTA maps are focused on one as-
pect of ICT penetration, i.e. computers, and they also stop at the time when these 
started to merge with cellphones, which increasingly incorporate IT services. 
Digital infrastructure has now become more sophisticated and i-pods have ap-
peared. In this respect, the maps disregard the importance of the cellphone, so-
cial media and e-learning in social transformation. By contrast to a necessarily 
limited mapping exercise, therefore, policy guidelines must take into account 
several additional aspects of ICT technology and use, which the EU2020S has 
not tapped, and which are more important than, e.g., the use of computers, or 
persons employed in ICT. In order to draw policy lines, we will now examine: 
(1) the penetration of the cellphone, (2) the use and width of social networks, 
and (3) the institutionalization of e-learning. These are all important in under-
standing Digital Societies and producing policy guidelines.
2  “Automated ways of identifying the locations of Internet users are becoming increasingly sophisticated 
(see, for example, Atlas of Cyberspace at http://www.cybergeography.org/atlas/ and The Economist, 2001), 
and set to increase with the development of location-based services. However, the exploitation of such 
sources of data faces two main challenges: commercial sensitivity, and therefore access, and the need to 
have the full and informed consent of the data subjects for secondary analysis” (Craglia et al., 2004: 61).
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8.4.1. The Importance of the Cellphone
Wireless technology and digital communication took off “with the most per-
vasive technology, the mobile phone. Mobile telephony really began to take 
off worldwide in the mid-1900s, when the ratio of mobile to mainline phones 
went up from about 1:34 (1991), to about 1:8 (1995). By 2000, there was one 
mobile phone to less than two mainlines, and by 2003 mobile phone subscrip-
tions had overtaken mainline subscriptions for the first time. Thus, within the 
span of about 10 years mobile telephony has moved from being the technol-
ogy for a privileged few, to essentially a mainstream technology” (Castells 
et al., 2004: 5). This has been the most democratic industrial revolution ever 
(Leontidou, 2010).
Table 8.1. Mobile telephone penetration growth rates (in percentage) in selected 
European countries (1995-2003). Source: Castells et al. (2004: 28).
spain 3800 Luxembourg 1619
Belgium 3386 Italy 1488
France 3093 Switzerland 1328
greece 2989 United Kingdom 859
Portugal 2627 Iceland 837
netherlands 2206 Denmark 564
Ireland 1928 Finland 449
Austria 1842 norway 405
Germany 1726 Sweden 391
Cellphone penetration has developed with interesting differences in rates 
among world regions, given that “Currently [2003], Europe leads (55.4%), 
followed by Oceania (54.4%) and north America (53%). These three regions 
each have more than one mobile telephone subscriber per two persons. They 
are followed distantly by Rest of the American continent (21.9%), Asia (15%) 
and Africa (6%), all of which have less than half the penetration rates of the 
top three regions” (Castells et al., 2004: 6). As shown in Table 8.1, “Euro-
pean countries such as Finland (448%) and Sweden (391%) had low rates, 
clearly a result of their already mature markets” (Castells et al., 2004: 28). 
“Quantitative data show that […] the European average penetration of mobile 
telephones is over 55%. Within the EU25 in particular, this ratio rises to 80% 
112 113
European Regions in the Strategy to Emerge from the Crisis: the Territorial Dimension of the ‘Europe 2020’Rubén Camilo Lois González & Valerià Paül (editors)
and, in some countries, it is above 90% (Scandinavian countries, for instance). 
In practical terms, these figures point to the high popularization of this nICT” 
(Castells et al. 2004: 63).
The disaggregation in maps by nUTS2 and nUTS3 as done in SIES-
TA sometimes masks more important trends understood by re-aggregation. 
In 2004, the rate of cellphone subscriptions in the EU25 was split in an inter-
esting way. “We consider the EU25, which is the current Union, but make a 
distinction between the ten new members of the 2004 enlargement (identified 
as EU10) and the former members (identified as EU15). This distinction is 
of the most interest because of the socioeconomical differentiation of these 
two groups of countries […]. We can see that in 2000 the number of mobile 
subscriptions surpassed the fixed ones in EU15, while this situation did not 
happen in the EU10 until the next year” (Castells et al., 2004: 14). “The lead-
ing countries are, as usual, the nordic ones with Finland arriving at a pene-
tration of 92% of households in 2003. What is most relevant is that the gap 
with respect to the Scandinavian countries has decreased over time, leading 
to a situation, in 2003, in which 7 out of every 10 households had a mobile 
telephone, except for France (66%)” (Castells et al., 2004: 63). France figures 
as a lagging country in other respects of ICT penetration in the Map 8.4.
8.4.2. Social networks and Interactive Media
Wireless technology and digital communication has become interactive. Cities 
have played a leading role in digitisation and the related social change, with 
mobilisations through the use of the Internet and social media (Leontidou, 
2010, 2012). The list below sums up some of the main social networking sites 
according to Institute of Employment Studies (2009: 7). These, and others 
similar, have generated a variety of new forms of interconnection which re-
main largely under-researched.
- Facebook — a social networking service where users create personal 
profiles, add other users as friends and exchange messages, including 
automatic notifications when they update their own profile. Addition-
ally, users may join common-interest user groups, organised by com-
mon characteristics (e.g. workplace).
- Twitter — a microblogging service enabling its users to send and read 
publicly visible messages called tweets. Tweets are text-based posts 
of up to 140 characters displayed on the user’s profile page. Users 
may subscribe to other users’ tweets.
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- LinkedIn — a business-related social networking site mainly used for 
professional networking. Users maintain a list of contact details of 
people with whom they have some level of relationship, called con-
nections. This list of connections can then be used to build up a con-
tact network, follow different companies and find jobs, people and 
business opportunities.
- MySpace — an online community of users’ personal profiles. These 
typically include photographs, information about personal interests 
and blogs. Users send one another messages and socialise within the 
MySpace community.
- YouTube — a video-sharing website on which users can upload, 
share, and view videos. A wide variety of user-generated video con-
tent is displayed, including film and TV clips as well as amateur con-
tent such as video blogging. Media corporations including the BBC 
also offer some of their material via the site. Most videos enable users 
to leave and exchange comments.
- Wikipedia — a collaborative web-based encyclopaedia project; its 
18 million articles have been written collaboratively by volunteers 
around the world, and almost all articles are freely editable by any 
visitor. A prominent web 2.0 site but not an example of social net-
working site per se.
8.4.3. The Importance of e-Learning
E-learning has different branches, including Open and Distance Learning, Life-
long Learning and training, and the active interaction with the Internet. We will 
not expand on these, because other EU2020S flagship initiatives refer to them 
—but not adequately— and because the lengthy reports of expert knowledge 
that the Hellenic Open University can provide on these issues are outside the 
scope of this paper. But they are certainly not outside the scope of the achieve-
ment of smart growth and the Digital Society sought by the EU2020S. The map-
ping of Open Universities would be a welcome step forward, though e-Learning 
is currently encouraged in traditional Universities, too.
8.5. Conclusion: Geographies of Information and Communications 
Technologies
In conclusion, our few policy guidelines, which are relevant for the flagship 
initiative “A Digital Agenda for Europe” thematic scope, must be read in com-
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bination with policy guidelines for the flagship initiatives “Innovation Union”, 
“Youth on the Move”, and “An Agenda for new Skills and Jobs”. However, 
the EU is in the middle of a crisis which makes the adoption of such guide-
lines problematic or unlikely, and that is an understatement. We have stressed 
that mapping a few indicators is inadequate for explanation and for policy 
guidelines. The comparison of patterns among the 4 maps and between these 
4 and the rest of the maps developed within the SIESTA Project, can certainly 
not identify the economic, geographical, industrial, governmental policy and 
socio-cultural factors affecting the adoption of wireless communication tech-
nology in different regions and countries (as in Castells et al., 2004: 35-38), 
and the impact of this adoption on societies.  
We have followed the route of all researchers who seek “less rigorous 
but pragmatically feasible indicators that capture at least some of the dimen-
sions identified” (Craglia et al., 2004: 61). However, infrastructure, high-
speed broadband connections, and high Internet velocity access is not all that 
matters. We have assessed a “need to focus not just on measures of physical 
access to the Internet but also on the extent to which the information available 
can make a difference to the quality of life, for example, through better provi-
sion of services, more direct dealing with government, greater participation, 
stronger community action, and whether the citizens across social and eco-
nomic groupings have the skills, education, and knowledge necessary not only 
to access such information, but also to interpret it and use it to their benefit 
(social access)” (Craglia et al., 2004: 60). In any case, the projection is that as 
the older generation passes out, “digital illiteracy” will become scarcer.
Uneven regional development is to be expected in ICTs, which tend to 
form clusters of production, which create inequalities. This, however, is bal-
anced out by networks of penetration and communication, which contribute 
in territorial cohesion through the facilitation of interaction among people, 
collectivities, cities, regions, universities, enterprises, institutional units, and 
several other entities. The high share of GDP invested in R&D (over 3% ac-
cording to the EU2020S wish), the provision of infrastructure, high-speed 
broadband connections and Internet velocity access are therefore useful in 
promoting territorial cohesion, but do not seem to be the exclusive ways for-
ward. 
Planners and policy makers could work the other way round in order to 
engage populations in the digital society. The improvement of high-speed 
broadband connections is not a policy guideline which will boost demand for 
the Internet, nor can this be created by “educating” people who are “digitally 
illiterate” (as repeatedly stated in the EU2020S documentation). Rather, the 
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EU should encourage the activation of interest and involvement by support-
ing activities presupposing interaction within the Internet. Populations may 
be encouraged to seek physical access to the Internet by the modernization 
of public administration, by improvements in e-Government and e-Learning, 
which will contribute towards the improvement of their quality of life. During 
the crisis in Europe, the Digital Society points to a way forward, provided that 
the EU encourages several ICT-assisted low-cost activities which would be 
otherwise impossible.
Finally, it has to be pointed out that in general, in the ESPOn space we 
have to distinguish between the 15 old member states (EU15), the recent ad-
ditions to the EU (in 2004 and 2007) and the rest of the European countries 
which are not part of the EU. There are differences across and among them. 
But the most important distinction is related to which type of model will the 
EU and Europe itself follow in order to regulate and develop the Digital So-
ciety. In this respect we can say that right now there are at least three types 
of thinking regarding future developments: firstly, the (neo)liberal model of 
deregulation. Secondly, and in some opposition to that, we still have the Eu-
ropean public service/public utility model which is directed towards the gov-
ernment regulating the field. And, finally, at EU member-states level, there 
are national models to consider. The above are to be found in many EU (and 
national policies) concerning the development of digital society in Europe as 
a whole. In general policy terms the main (unanswered question) still is: is the 
advancement of Digital Society primarily an economic project, is it political, 
or is it targeted towards social and cultural considerations and concerns?  
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